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Abstract
We model a situation in which a collection of species derive their fitnesses via a
rock-paper-scissors-type game; however, the precise payoffs are a function of the envi-
ronment. The new aspect of our model lies in adding a feedback loop: the environment
changes according to the relative fitnesses of the species; in particular, it gives a boost
to the species having small populations. We cast our model in the setting of a differen-
tial game and we show that for a certain setting of parameters, this dynamics cycles.
Our model is a natural one, since depletion of resources used by more frequent species
will shift the payoff matrix towards favoring less frequent ones. Since the dynamics
cycles, no species goes extinct and diversity is maintained.
1 Introduction
Game theory has yielded deep insights into biological phenomena for almost a cen-
tury. For example, the work of Fisher, Haldane, and Wright gave the central model of
replicator dynamics which has been used extensively to study evolutionary processes.
Over the last few years, algorithmic game theory has contributed substantial ideas to
this field. In particular, Chastain et. al. [4] showed that replicator dynamics can be
viewed as the highly versatile algorithm of multiplicative weights update (MWU) and a
sequence of papers used this insight to study the process of evolution [4, 12, 14, 15, 13].
In most biological phenomena, the fitness of strategies is frequency-dependent and
fixed payoff matrices are insufficient to describe them. One way of understanding some
of these phenomena is via dynamic games, in which the payoff matrix can change
with time. Two main categories of such games are stochastic games [22] which are
discrete, with the payoff matrix being governed by a Markov chain, and differential
games [7], the state space of which is described via a differential equation (continuous
∗On leave from Georgia Tech.
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time dynamical system). An example of the first is [15], which studies evolution via the
MWU algorithm, and an example of the second is the recent elegant model of Weitz
et al. [24], studying a dynamical version of the tragedy of the commons.
The work presented here is inspired by the last paper, [24]. A tragedy of the com-
mons occurs when a large number of agents simultaneously play a Prisoner’s Dilemma-
type game. Selfish behavior on the part of agents, i.e., defection, leads to a highly
sub-optimal outcome as compared to the globally best outcome in which all agents
cooperate. An early, and motivating example, of this phenomena was cattle grazing in
a common pasture. Each shepherd’s selfish strategy of letting his cattle overgraze leads
to a depleted pasture land. The novel idea in [24] was to model a situation in which
the actions of the agents slowly change the environment, and hence the payoff matrix,
so that the selfish strategy of agents itself changes. They give differential equations
modeling this situation and show regimes of parameters under which the game cycles
between the two extremes of replete and depleted environments, with selfish behavior
cycling between cooperation and defection.
The underlying game analyzed by Weitz et. al. is particularly simple in that each
agent has only two strategies. In this paper, we consider a more complex class of games
which are non-transitive, namely rock-paper-scissors, which has three strategies, and its
generalization to n strategies. The rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game belongs to a general
class of negative feedbacks in biology caused by non-transitivity. In such scenarios,
there is no global optimum, as each strategy beats one of the other two, and is beaten
by a third. Non-transitive dynamics appear to be widespread in biology, and rock-
paper-scissors games have been reported in diverse organisms, including plants [11, 3],
animals [23], and microorganisms [9, 10, 8]. In general, rock paper scissors dynamics
maintain biological diversity (i.e., individuals, genes, or species), as no single strategy is
capable of outright dominance [11, 9, 20]. Most prior models of RPS dynamics used in
biology assumed fixed payoff matrices. This is an incongruity with biology, where the
fitness of most strategies will be frequency-dependent. On the other hand, analyzing
complex games, such as RPS, in the setting of differential games is not straightforward
and there is a need to develop techniques for doing this.
Our model is as follows: We assume that the fitness of a collection of species is
given by a rock-paper-scissors-type game. Additionally, the precise payoff matrix is a
function of the environment. The new aspect of our model lies in adding a feedback
loop: the environment changes according to the relative fitnesses of the species; in
particular, it gives a boost to the species having smaller populations. We cast our
model in the setting of a differential game and we show that for a certain setting
of parameters, this dynamics cycles. Our model is a natural one, since depletion of
resources used by more frequent species will shift the payoff matrix towards favoring
less frequent ones. Since the dynamics cycles, no species goes extinct and diversity is
maintained.
More precisely, assume a population of n species and let x give the relative popu-
lation of each species at any point in time, i.e., xi gives the fraction of population of
species i. We define P1, . . . ,Pn to be n RPS-type payoff matrices, where P i favors
species i over other species. At any point in time, the payoff matrix P is a convex
combination of these n matrices given by weights w . We now define two replicator
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dynamics:
1. The population x follows a replicator dynamics based on payoff matrix P .
2. The weights w change according to a second replicator dynamics, based on x ,
in such a way that for smaller population species i, the weight of P i tends to
increase, hence giving species i a boost.
Our techniques: We analyze a modification of the model of Weitz et al. [24]. In our
setting, the payoff matrix corresponds to an RPS game for n ≥ 3 species (strategies).
We show that the dynamics as defined in (1) “cycle” in the following sense: For all
but a measure zero of initial population vectors x 0 > 0 and weight vectors w0 > 0
(strictly positive coordinates) and for any  > 0, the trajectory of (1) will return to
a distance at most  from (x 0,w0) infinitely often (for an illustration of the theorem,
see Figures 1,2). The proof of the main theorem relies on the Poincare´ recurrence
theorem 2.2, a well known theorem established a century ago. In words, the theorem
says that systems that satisfy the two conditions of conservation of volume and that
no orbit goes to the boundary will, after finite time, return to a state very close to the
initial state and this will happen an infinite number of times. We proved that under
a certain homeomorphic transformation Π (see Definition 3.1), our dynamics satisfies
both conditions of Poincare´’s theorem.
We established the second condition (Lemma 3.2) by coming up with a log-barrier
function (a similar idea is used in constrained optimization) which is finite in the interior
of the state space and infinite at the boundary and by proving that this function is
constant with respect to time. This suffices to prove that the orbits do not reach the
boundary of ∆n ×∆n (and hence the orbits for the transformed system under Π are
bounded). The former condition can be proved via Liouville’s theorem 2.1 (see also
[21]). Finally, it can be shown that Π−1 exists and is continuous, hence the result for
the transformed dynamics carries over to the original dynamics (1). Our results hold
for any dimensions in contrast to [24]; their results hold for 2 dimensions (2× 2 payoff
matrices) only.
We believe that these kinds of techniques will be useful for future models of non-
transitive dynamics. We also believe that such models will benefit from a study within
algorithmic game theory.
1.1 Model
1.1.1 Classic RPS
RPS is a game between two players, each of whom has three strategies. The payoff
matrix can be written as
P =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 .
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The RPS game can be generalized to more than three strategies, with the n×n payoff
matrix being:
P =

0 −1 0 0 . . . 0 0 1
1 0 −1 0 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0 −1
−1 0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0
 .
In the context of biology, we will have n competing species corresponding to the n
strategies, Let x be the population vector where xi is the fraction of the population
that is species i and r be the fitness vector. Note that r can be computed given x ,
i.e., r = Px . The replicator dynamics under P is
x′i = xi(ri − r) ∀i,
where r = x>Px is the average fitness (if P is antisymmetric, r is zero).
We will call the above the static setting, since P is fixed. Replicator dynamics
in zero sum games have already been analyzed, proving that it has limit cycles or is
recurrent (e.g., see [1, 21, 18, 17]).
1.1.2 Dynamic payoff matrix
We next define a dynamic setting, where at all times the payoff matrix is a convex
combination of n matrices:
Pw = w1P1 + w2P2 + · · ·+ wnPn,
where
P1 = P +

0 µ . . . µ µ
−µ 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
−µ 0 . . . 0 0
 ,P2 = P +

0 −µ 0 . . . 0
µ 0 µ . . . µ
0 −µ 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 −µ 0 . . . 0
 , . . . ,
Pn = P +

0 0 . . . 0 −µ
0 0 . . . 0 −µ
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0 −µ
µ µ . . . µ 0
 .
Formally, P i−P is a matrix with entries µ at the i-th row and −µ at the i-th column
(rest of the entries and diagonal entry (i, i) are zero). It can be seen that for µ > 0
(for the rest of the paper µ ≥ 0), P i favors type i by increasing the payoff of i when
competing with other types. The weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) changes according
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to the replicator dynamics under the following matrix
A˚ =

0 x2 − x1 x3 − x1 . . . xn−1 − x1 xn − x1
x1 − x2 0 x3 − x2 . . . xn−1 − x2 xn − x2
...
...
...
...
...
...
x1 − xn x2 − xn x3 − xn . . . xn−1 − xn 0
 .
In words, Pw changes with time. The idea behind the way w changes, is that species
with small population should be favored. Since A˚ is also anti-symmetric and has 0
entries in the diagonal, the replicator dynamics update rule of w is
w′i = wi
∑
j
wj(xj − xi) ∀i.
By model’s definition,
Pw =

0 −1 + µ(w1 − w2) µ(w1 − w3) . . . 1 + µ(w1 − wn)
1 + µ(w2 − w1) 0 −1 + µ(w2 − w3) . . . µ(w2 − wn)
...
...
...
...
...
µ(wn−1 − w1) µ(wn−1 − w2) µ(wn−1 − w3) . . . −1 + µ(wn−1 − wn)
−1 + µ(wn − w1) µ(wn − w2) µ(wn − w3) . . . 0
 .
Note that P is anti-symmetric and has 0 entries in the diagonal. The replicator dy-
namics of x becomes
x′i = xi · si ∀i,
where s = Pwx is the fitness vector of population x under Pw . Summing up, the
system of ordinary differential equations that we would like to analyze is captured by
(wi depends on xi)
x′i = xi
∑
j
Pwijxj , w
′
i = wi
∑
j
wj(xj − xi) ∀i. (1)
Notation: We denote the probability simplex on a set of size n as ∆n. Vectors in
Rn are denoted in bold-face letters x and are considered as column vectors. The i-th
coordinate is denoted by xi. To denote a row vector we use x
>. The time derivative
of a function y = y(t) is denoted by y′.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Dynamical Systems
Let f : S → S be continuously differentiable with S ⊂ Rn, S an open set. A continuous
(time) dynamical system is of the form
y ′ ≡ dy
dt
= f(y). (2)
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Since f is continuously differentiable, the system of ordinary differential equations (ode
(2)) along with the initial condition y(0) = y0 ∈ S has a unique solution for t ∈ I(y0)
(some time interval) and we can present it by φ(t,y0), called the flow of the system.
φt(y0) ≡ φ(t,y0) corresponds to a function of time which captures the trajectory/orbit
of the system with y0 the given starting point. It is continuously differentiable, its
inverse exists (denoted by φ−t(y0)) and is also continuously differentiable (called dif-
feomorphism) in the so called maximal interval of existence I. It is also true that
φt ◦ φs = φt+s for t, s, t+ s ∈ I. y0 ∈ S is called an equilibrium if f(y0) = 0. In that
case holds φt(y0) = y0 for all t ∈ I, i.e., y0 is a fixed point of the function φt(y) for
all t ∈ I.
If f is globally Lipschitz then the flow is defined for all t ∈ R, i.e., I = R. One
way to enforce the dynamical system to have a well-defined flow for all t ∈ R is to
renormalize the vector field by ‖f(y)‖+ 1, i.e., the resulting dynamical system will be
dy
dt =
f(y)
‖f(y)‖+1 , because the function becomes globally 1-Lipschitz. The two dynamical
systems (before and after renormalization) are topologically equivalent ([16], p. 184).
Formally this means that there exists a homeomorphism H which maps trajectories of
(2) onto trajectories of the renormalized flow and preserves the direction of time. In
words it means that the two systems have the same behavior/geometry (same fixed
points, convergence properties, phase portrait). For the rest of the paper, we may
assume that the flow of dynamics (1) is well-defined for all t ∈ R.
Definition 2.1 (Volume preserving). The differential equation (2) is said to be
volume preserving on S if for any measurable set B ⊆ S, we have ν(φt(B)) = ν(B) for
all t ∈ R, where ν is the Lebesgue measure and φt the flow of the ode.
The most common way to prove that the flow is volume preserving is via the
Liouville’s theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Liouville theorem [21]). Let y ′ = f(y) be an ode with flow φt. It
holds that
dν(φt(B))
dt
=
∫
φt(B)
(∇ · f)dν, for each Lebesgue measurable set B.
Therefore, as long as ∇ · f = 0, the flow preserves volume.
In 1890, Poincare´ [19] showed that whenever a dynamical system preserves volume,
almost all trajectories return arbitrarily close to their initial position an infinite number
of times.
Theorem 2.2 (Poincare´ Recurrence [19, 2]). If a flow preserves volume and has
only bounded orbits then for each open set there exist orbits that intersect the set in-
finitely often.
For more information on dynamical systems see [16] and for readers familiar with
game theory see [6, 21].
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2.2 Replicator Dynamics and Evolution
Replicator equations, first were introduced by Fisher [5] in 30’s for genotype evolution.
The simplest form of replicator equations is the following:
x′i(t) = xi(t)((Ax (t))i − x (t)>Ax (t)).
where A is a payoff matrix (generally non-negative), x a vector that lies in simplex
and (Ax )i denotes
∑
j Aijxj . Observe that in the nonlinear dynamics above, simplex is
invariant (if we start from a probability distribution, the vector remains a probability
distribution). This dynamics is called replicator dynamics and has been used numerous
times in biology, evolution, game theory and genetic algorithms. The dynamics we
analyze in this paper is a version of replicator dynamics (on generalized RPS with
dynamics payoff matrix).
3 Our results
In this section we state and prove our main result. Our main theorem can be stated
formally as follows (see also Figures 1,2):
Theorem 3.1. For all but measure zero of initial positions, the trajectories of the
dynamics (1) return arbitrarily close to their initial position an infinite number of
times.
Definition 3.1 (Natural transformation [6]). We define the natural transformation
Π : int(∆n)→ Rn−1 to be Π(y) =
(
log
(
y1
yn
)
, ..., log
(
yn−1
yn
))
. In words, we map every
point y of the interior of simplex to a point in Rn−1. It is not hard to see that
the map is injective and surjective. The reason is that Π−1 exists and is equal to
Π−1(z ) =
(
ez1
1+
∑n−1
j=1 e
zj
, . . . , e
zn−1
1+
∑n−1
j=1 e
zj
, 1
1+
∑n−1
j=1 e
zj
)
. The points on the boundary of
simplex correspond to vectors with infinity Euclidean norm in Rn−1.
Lemma 3.2. Let (x 0,w0) be an initial point in the interior of ∆n × ∆n. The dy-
namics mapped to Rn−1 × Rn−1 (under natural mapping (Π,Π)) has bounded orbits
(Π(x t),Π(w t)).
Proof. We define the log-barrier function
D(x ) =
n∑
i=1
log
(
1
xi
)
.
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Computing the derivative we get,
D′(x ) = −
∑
i
x′i
xi
= −
∑
i
si
= −
(∑
i
xiµ
(∑
(wj − wi)
))
= −µ
(∑
i
xi(1− nwi)
)
= −µ
(
1− n
∑
i
wixi
)
.
We also define the log-barrier function
D(w) =
n∑
i=1
log
(
1
wi
)
,
and we have
D′(w) = −
∑
i
w′i
wi
= −
∑
i
∑
j
wj(xj − xi)
= −
∑
j
∑
i
wj(xj − xi)
= −
∑
j
wj(nxj − 1)
= −
n∑
j
wjxj − 1
 .
Therefore,
D′(x ) + µD′(w) = −µ
(
1− n
∑
i
wixi
)
− µ
(
n
∑
i
wixi − 1
)
=
(
n
∑
i
wixi − 1
)
(µ− µ) = 0.
Hence,
D(x ) + µD(w)
is a constant motion of time (independent of time). It is also clear that D(x ), D(w) ≥ 0
and become infinity only on the boundary of ∆n × ∆n. Since D(x 0) + µD(w0) is
bounded (i.e., (x 0,w0) is an interior point), we get that D(x t) + µD(w t) is bounded
for all times t, hence there is no subsequence of times tk so that (x
tk ,w tk) converges
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to the boundary of ∆n × ∆n. Therefore there is no subsequence of times tk so that∥∥(Π(x tk),Π(w tk))∥∥
2
goes to infinity, i.e., the dynamics on Rn−1×Rn−1 (under natural
mapping (Π,Π)) has bounded orbits.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Under the mapping Π for x ,w , set y ≡ Π(x ) and z ≡ Π(w).
We shall show that the dynamics (y ′, z ′) = g(y , z ) satisfies the conditions of the
Poincare´ recurrence theorem (Theorem 2.2), where g is the vector field of the resulting
dynamics, after the transformation (Π,Π).
The vector field becomes y′i =
xn
xi
x′ixn−xix′n
x2n
=
x′i
xi
− x′nxn =
∑
j(P
w
ij − Pwnj)xj =
x1 + xi−1 − xn−1 − xi+1 + µ(wi − wn) (with the convention that x0 = xn). Similarly
z′i =
wn
wi
w′iwn−wiw′n
w2n
=
w′i
wi
− w′nwn =
∑
j wj(xn − xi) = xn − xi.
After substitution (using Π−1) we get
y′i =
ey1 + eyi−1 − eyn−1 − eyi+1
1 +
∑n−1
j=1 e
yj
+ µ
ezi − 1
1 +
∑n−1
j=1 e
zj
, z′i =
1− eyi
1 +
∑n−1
j=1 e
yj
. (3)
We shall prove that the flow of the dynamics (3) preserves the volume, by showing that
∇ · g = 0 (then it follows from Liouville’s theorem 2.1).
Set S =
∑n−1
j=1 e
yj . We compute the partial derivatives and we get that
∂g
∂y1
= e
y1 (1+S)−ey1 (1+ey1−ey2−eyn−1 )
(1+S)2
,
∂g
∂yj
= − eyj (ey1+eyj−1−eyj+1−eyn−1 )
(1+S)2
, for 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 2,
∂g
∂yn−1 =
−eyn−1 (1+S)−eyn−1 (ey1+eyn−2−1−eyn−1 )
(1+S)2
,
∂g
∂zj
= 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1.
(4)
Therefore we get that
∇ · g =
n−1∑
j=1
∂g
∂yj
+
n−1∑
j=1
∂g
∂zj
=
−∑n−1j=1 eyj (ey1 + eyj−1 − eyj+1 − eyn−1) + (ey1 − eyn−1)(1 +∑n−1j=1 eyj )
(1 + S)2
,
with the convention that y0 = yn = 0. We get that all the terms of the form e
yjeyj+1
cancel out (telescopically) and also terms ey1eyj , eyn−1eyj also cancel out for all j, i.e., it
turns out that ∇·g = 0. Hence we conclude from Liouville theorem that the dynamical
system (3) preserves volume.
Using the fact that the flow preserves the volume and that the orbits are bounded
(Lemma 3.2), we apply Poincare´ recurrence theorem on (y˜ , z˜ ) = g(y , z ) for a small
open ball around any initial point (y˜0, z˜ 0) and the claim follows for the transformed
dynamics. Since Π−1 is continuous, if the distance between two points goes to zero in
Rn−1 × Rn−1, so it does in ∆n ×∆n and the claim follows for the dynamics (1).
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Figure 1: Trajectories of the vector x for different initial positions with µ = 0.1. Trajectories
intersect due to the fact 6 dimensions are projected to a 3D figure. The “cycling” behavior
is observed.
4 Discussion
Let us first address some immediate generalizations of our model. Our proofs can be
easily extended to the case where in the antisymmetric matrix P , each 1 and -1 pair
is replaced by a and −a, for a different parameter a. We have presented the simpler
case in this abstract in order to enhance clarity of the main new ideas. The full paper
will contain the more general case.
There are several generalizations of our model which are worth studying. For ex-
ample, what happens if each matrix P i has its own parameter µi? So far we have
not been able to prove cycling for this general case but simulations indicate that the
system does cycle. Understanding the range of parameters which lead to cycling and
those that do not will be interesting.
We are not aware of other uses of the Poincare´ theorem in differential games. It
will be nice to see other applications of this powerful theorem to learning dynamics,
other than replicator dynamics, where the state space (payoff matrix) changes as per
a differential equation.
More broadly, we believe that the work of [24] and our work are opening up the pos-
sibility of modeling more complex biological phenomena using the setting of differential
games and obtaining insights into new biological phenomena.
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Figure 2: Trajectories of the vector w for different initial positions with µ = 0.1. Trajectories
intersect due to the fact 6 dimensions are projected to a 3D figure. The “cycling” behavior
is observed.
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